Does Density Matter? The Significance of Comparative Historical Variation in Unionization by Vernon, Guy
www.ssoar.info
Does Density Matter? The Significance of
Comparative Historical Variation in Unionization
Vernon, Guy
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Vernon, G. (2006). Does Density Matter? The Significance of Comparative Historical Variation in Unionization.
European Journal of Industrial Relations, 12(2), 189-209. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959680106065040
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-222714
Guy Vernon
Henley Management College, UK
Does Density Matter? The
Significance of Comparative
Historical Variation in Unionization
ABSTRACT ■ This article reviews the variations in aggregate union density in
fifteen industrialized societies over the period 1960–2000. Drawing critically
on a range of literatures, it argues that density is a valuable if imperfect
expression of the weight of the infrastructure of joint regulation. Whilst
density levels cannot express the character or anatomy of this regulation,
they broadly depict the constraints imposed on managerial prerogative by
routinized joint regulation.
KEYWORDS: joint regulation ■ managerial prerogative ■ social rights ■ union
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Introduction
Union membership density has been one of the most studied single
aspects of organized industrial relations. Cross-national variation, and
changes over time, in density data have featured prominently in text-
books on comparative employment relations, while there have been
numerous attempts to account statistically and econometrically for
trends and variations (for example Western, 1997). These examinations
have been facilitated by the efforts of Bain and Price (1980), Visser (1989,
1991) and Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) to collate comparable statistics
on aggregate union density through the 20th century for the main indus-
trialized nations.
Yet despite the attention to density, comments on its meaning are scant,
dispersed and contradictory. It commonly seems to be taken for granted
that density captures something of the overarching concerns of the
comparative industrial relations literature; perhaps the ‘strength’ or
‘efficacy’ of ‘institutions’ referred to by Ferner and Hyman (1998: xi,
xxiii). But this must be demonstrated, and the present article considers
the significance of aggregate union density in representing or expressing
the social regulation of work: the core concern of the industrial relations
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literature. It does not seek to develop the causal explanations of the trends
in density offered in the recent econometric literature, but rather it estab-
lishes the significance of density through detailed consideration of its
empirical concomitants. These concomitants cannot be discerned from
this econometric literature for three reasons. First, much of this literature
has focussed on explaining changes in density, rather than its compara-
tive levels. Second, the purpose of this literature has dictated that only
relationships between density and features of the institutional environ-
ment which might plausibly be argued to influence it have been explored.
Third, because this literature has attempted an integrated explanation of
developments in density, the work has been multivariate. This necessarily
obscures the simple bilateral, or bivariate, associations of density.
Just as in the extensive comparative contributions of Western (1997)
and Traxler et al. (2001), reference here is principally to literature in
English, but the discussion ranges widely. It cannot consider anything but
‘dominant tendencies’ (Hyman, 2001: x) within nations, so that sectoral
differences within national borders are neglected. The following section
briefly examines the treatment of the significance of aggregate union
density in the literature. The succeeding section considers matters of defi-
nition, and presents comparable density figures for 15 advanced industri-
alized nations over the period 1960–2000. The extended section which
follows considers, with reference to the experiences of these nations, the
comparative historical relationship between aggregate union density and
the social regulation of work. The final section clarifies the implications
of the assessment, concluding that union density generally expresses of
the weight of routinized joint regulation, though not of individual social
rights.
What Does Density Mean?
It is common to assume that density is a significant indicator, but less
common to consider why. Visser claims that membership is a ‘critical
resource’ of unions, and, whilst acknowledging the need for ‘organiz-
ational, institutional and political detail’ (1992: 22, 24), that comparative
union density is a ‘shorthand though incomplete picture of the overall
strength of unions’. Crouch (1993) uses ‘union density’ interchangeably
with ‘union strength’ in his charts. Traxler et al. (2001: 79) assert that
density is the ‘primary power resource’ of unions, whilst Blaschke (2000:
217) describes it as the ‘most readily available indicator’ of ‘union
strength’. Western (1997: 3, 15) regards density as expressive of unions’
influence, not only within industry but within society, and indeed refers
to union organization and the labour movement synonymously. Such
treatments of density echo the work of Stephens (1979) and Korpi (1983),
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who regarded the resource afforded by density as transferable, such that
it might be deployed not only in the industrial but also in the political
sphere.
Most efforts to argue the significance of aggregate density have centred
on the importance of mass membership for unionism. For example,
Visser (1992) suggests that the sheer weight of unionized numbers, of
itself, is of much significance for the position of unions towards not only
employers but the state, and hence, by implication, for the significance of
unions in the social regulation of work. Other authors have however
argued that density alone does not equate to union strength. France has
loomed large in this argument: French unionism is perceived as a
unionism of activists, so that the equivalent of a union member in Britain,
for example, is an employee voting for a union candidate in elections to
the comité d’entreprise (Goetschy, 1998). A similar argument might be
made with reference to the Italian union movement, which shares some-
thing of the French ideological heritage (Accornero, 1992). Such reflec-
tions challenge the significance of membership.
Literature on the bases of density might also be taken to question its
significance. There has been growing attention to the relationship
between density and the nature of the administration of the welfare state:
where unions have an established role in the administration of unemploy-
ment benefit, under the ‘Ghent’ systems of Belgium, Denmark, Finland
and Sweden, employees have a distinctive incentive to join unions
(Blaschke, 2000; Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1999; Traxler et al., 2001;
Western, 1997). Hence Van Ours (2002) claims that membership (and
thus density) is an artefact of the organization of the welfare state.
Though membership may vary cross-nationally in meaning, this does
not preclude a role for density as an indicator of social regulation. Another
strand of ‘contingency’ appears pertinent here — the commonplace obser-
vation that density may be of varying significance for joint regulation
dependent upon the larger industrial relations infrastructure. Yet density
could conceivably express this very infrastructure itself. Ultimately, to
assess the significance of density as an indicator requires a general empiri-
cal examination of the institutional concomitants of density.
The Uncertainties of Density Data
Density data rest on treacherous foundations. By construction they gloss
over debates centred around the issue of union identity (Hyman, 2001),
and of the relative regulatory purchase of class based unionism,
integrative reformism, and sectionalist trade, enterprise or plant
unionism. Moreover, they require judgements about the relevance of
membership (or non-membership) amongst groups extending beyond
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the employed workforce: the non-agricultural employed, the total
employed, the dependent workforce, the labour force, or the total popu-
lation. Traxler et al. (2001: 80), despite their focus on ‘the labour market’,
regard employed density as the most appropriate measure. Ebbinghaus
and Visser (1999) examine trends in ‘net density’: equivalent to employed
density in excluding not only retired but unemployed members. Unusu-
ally, Western (1997: 15) includes not only the unemployed but retired
membership in his preferred (‘gross’) density series. In the case of
Belgium in 1985, this gives rates 27 percentage points higher than esti-
mates of employed density.
Visser (1989) suggests that the inclusion of the retired in calculations
of union density is a distorting influence, implying that employed density
is of more analytical relevance for the situation of the workforce vis-a-
vis their employers. It is thus employed or ‘active’ density which is the
focus here. Figure 1 shows trends in employed density for 15 advanced
industrialized nations over four decades.1 There is continuity in the
relative position of most nations, but the differences are striking and
increase over the period. Density in France and the USA falls from being
low to very low; Switzerland, Japan and the Netherlands move from
moderate to low density; in Germany and Canada the levels remain
moderate, though that in Germany falls in recent years. Density in Italy
and the UK shifts quite markedly, rising until the late 1970s and falling
thereafter, but for the most part remains within the moderate range.
Density in Austria falls from high to moderate; in Norway and Belgium
it remains high; whilst in Denmark and Sweden it moves from high to
very high. The most striking change is in Finland, where density grows
from low to very high levels. What, if anything, though, do these patterns
express of the matters at the core of the industrial relations literature?
The General Significance of Union Density
Strike Activity
Goetschy and Rozenblatt (1992: 440) note the influence within French
unions of the notion that ‘strikes are the motor of social progress’. The
attention devoted to strikes in comparative industrial relations suggests
that strike activity is generally regarded as important in the social regu-
lation of work.
A (positive) relationship between strike activity and union member-
ship is frequently noted, though its nature is more rarely probed. There
are indeed for many nations historical relationships between union
density and gauges of strike activity, most typically relative involvement
(Franzosi, 1995; Kelly, 1989, 1998; Shalev, 1992; Shorter and Tilly, 1974;
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Western, 1997). Even within the Nordic cluster, where fluctuations in
density have been limited, there has been a tendency for fiercer ex-
plosions of strike activity to be associated, as elsewhere, with a more
rapid growth in union density (Stokke, 1999).
For present purposes, though, cross-national comparative associations
are vital. The relationship between strike volume (working days lost) and
density is of particular interest because of the greater cross-national
comparability of statistics (Shalev, 1992). Western (1997: 116–21: Table
7.4) shows that relative volume is related strongly even to the growth in
union density only in nations with decentralized bargaining structures
and/or low density. Such findings merely underline what is implicit in the
remarkable absence of published results on the relationship between the
level of union density and strike volume. It appears that enduring features
of the national industrial relations context are important in shaping the
comparative extent of strike activity (Clegg, 1976), and that these have no
simple relation to union density.
Local Organization
The most immediate manner in which density might be considered an
index of social regulation is by gauging the average weight of union
membership at workplace level. However, for many industrial relations
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FIGURE 1. Employed Union Membership Density (%) in Fifteen Nations,
1960–2000
scholars the statutory provision for representative participation at work-
place and company level is at least as significant for the social regulation
of work. This may indeed be causally related to union density. For some
writers (Cameron, 1984; Korpi, 1983), unions with high density are best
able to achieve strong statutory provision for industrial democracy.
Conversely, several authors (for example Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1999;
Terry, 1994) have attributed the divergent trends in density since the early
1980s largely to cross-national variation in the depth of statutory
buttressing of representative participation in the workplace.
Clearly there are limits to this relationship; France, with its very low
and falling density, has statutory provision for representative partici-
pation. Yet the exception may prove the rule: despite growing statutory
prescription, initially reflected in an upsurge in establishment collective
agreements, by the mid-1990s only a fifth of French employees were
covered by establishment bargaining of any sort (Goetschy, 1998).
Hancké (1993), considering the experiences of seven European nations
including France, suggests that whilst meaningful workplace organiz-
ation is often rooted in statutory provision for representative partici-
pation, such provision is neither necessary nor sufficient; it is however
strongly related to high, and still more so to relatively stable, union
density. Similarly, Visser (1992) argues that the growing differential in
density between Belgium and the Netherlands is associated with a much
more substantial Belgian workplace organization, despite the stronger
Dutch works council legislation.
This echoes Clegg’s observation (1976) that cross-national variation in
union density is related to the ‘depth of bargaining’: the extent of local
union involvement in the administration of agreements. Recent experi-
ence further supports this view. In the UK, union density rose rapidly in
the 1970s and then fell equally sharply, in parallel with the growth and
decline of powerful workplace organization (Batstone, 1988; Millward et
al., 2001). Contrasting developments in local organization in the USA and
Canada in the 1980s (Visser, 1992) are also reflected in quite different
density trajectories.
The National Infrastructure
There has been much attention to the level at which bargaining occurs,
usually on the assumption that centralized bargaining is more coherent,
or more meaningfully collective. A major concern in the industrial
relations literature has therefore been the implication of different forms
of decentralization of collective bargaining. There is much evidence of a
cross-national relation between union density and the established indices
of centralization (for example ILO, 1993: Chart 3), though it does seem
that the relationship is weakening (Traxler et al., 2001: Table III.1, III.5).
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The detailed discussions of developments in bargaining centralization
offered by, for example, Ferner and Hyman (1992, 1998), Regini (1992)
and Traxler et al. (2001), are also enlightening. Of those nations which
can be located more or less unambiguously, those where peak-level
bargaining predominated over the past few decades (Norway and Finland
and, until at least the early 1980s, Denmark and Sweden) tended to have
higher rates of union density than those with bargaining primarily at
industry level (Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy), which in turn
tended to have density higher than those where bargaining was typically
confined to the company or establishment (the USA, Canada and Japan).
Whilst France, with very low density despite sectoral bargaining, is
something of an exception, Traxler et al. (2001: Table III.1) rate its
centralization as little greater than in the Anglo-Saxon nations.
Moreover, the experience of Finland since the late 1960s shows a strong
longitudinal relationship between greater centralization of wage bargain-
ing and rapid growth in union density (Lilja, 1992). Then, the virtual
disappearance of industrial bargaining in the UK from the early 1980s
was accompanied by a collapse in union density. There are clearly limits
to such longitudinal relationships, as the more gradual, but sustained,
decline in density in Austria has not been associated with an obvious
change in the level of bargaining, whilst the demise of peak negotiations
in Sweden has not seen a substantial fall in density. Yet whilst there is
certainly no absolute correspondence between bargaining centralization
and density, there is much evidence of a general relation.
The contribution of Soskice (1990) has encouraged attention to the
coordination of bargaining. This has brought a myriad of competing
approaches to the analysis of coordination, and characterizations of
specific nations. However, the basis for the classification of particular
nations (for example Ferner and Hyman, 1998; Traxler, 1995) is not
entirely clear. Country studies featuring lengthy considerations of
coordination have not served to clarify the situation — witness the very
different accounts of the Swedish experience of the 1990s in Kjellberg
(1998) and Elvander (2002). Hence it is not possible to arrive here at a
considered scoring of coordination with which density may be compared.
Whilst assessments of bargaining centralization gauge the bargaining
level which predominates amongst those employees whose terms and
conditions are subject to collective bargaining, estimates of coverage
gauge the proportion of the total workforce whose terms and conditions
are subject to collective agreement. For Traxler et al. (2001: 194), ‘the
most important indicator of the degree of organization/disorganization
of labour markets is the coverage of collective agreements.’ The cross-
national correlation between union density and coverage is not strong:
for the countries examined in this article, the correlation in the mid-1990s
is only on the cusp of conventional statistical significance.2
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Where multi-employer agreements are generally absent and single-
employer bargaining predominates (Japan, Canada, the USA, and now
the UK), coverage is limited and density is correspondingly low or low-
moderate. Many of the nations with high or very high coverage (Sweden,
Finland, Denmark and Norway) also display high density. Yet other
nations with high or even very high coverage, similarly secured by a
predominance of multi-employer bargaining, have moderate, low or even
very low density: notably the Netherlands, and even more strikingly
France.
Yet how does multi-employer bargaining with high coverage affect the
organization of the employment relationship? Hyman (1997: 313) queries
the ‘meaningful content’ of industrial agreements. Where multi-employer
bargaining predominates, high collective bargaining coverage yields
extensive organization of the employment relationship; but the nature of
this organization is difficult to determine. Detailed attention to
procedural arrangements, such as the subjection of local bargaining to
peace clauses (Iversen, 1998), can offer only limited insight (Iversen and
Pontusson, 2000).
The British industrial relations literature of the 1960s and 1970s offers
a way forward in assessing the implications of multi-employer bargain-
ing. Flanders (1965), Marsh (1965) and Brown and Terry (1978) explored
its impact on wage determination, while contributors to the comparative
literature have also stressed the importance of the content of agreements.
Clegg (1976: 15) suggested that the ‘regulatory effect’ of industrial agree-
ments in France in the 1960s and early 1970s was small; Sisson (1987)
differentiated between countries where multi-employer pay agreements
took the form of ‘safety nets’, affecting only the very lowest paid, and
those countries where they affected the pay of all workers. Recently,
Marginson et al. (2003) have also examined the ‘substantive content’ of
sectoral agreements in metalworking and banking in several nations.
There is no systematic comparative work on the constraints on local
bargaining imposed by multi-employer agreements, but scattered
through the literature are illuminating comments on the (immediate)
regulatory effect of multi-employer bargaining.
With its very low density allied to a preponderance of multi-employer
agreements yielding high coverage, France is a critical case. Since the
1970s, there have been multi-industry agreements regarding non-pay
issues such as training, restructuring and the use of technology, some-
times transposed into statute, but these have had an uneven impact
(Goetschy, 1998). Even single texts can display ambivalence as to the
significance of such agreements in France; Traxler et al. admit that the
sectoral agreements which secure high coverage in France are of little
consequence, but also maintain that ‘sectoral bargaining has a notable
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impact, particularly on the upgrading of low paid workers’ (2001: 115,
195).
Under the 1982 Auroux laws, industry negotiators meet annually to
discuss pay, and reconsider job classifications every five years. This has
supported an enormous growth in the number of sectoral agreements
(Goetschy, 1998). Strikingly, however, such agreements have often stipu-
lated minima below the statutory minimum wage (Salaire minimum
interprofessionel de crossance [SMIC]) — from around a quarter to
around three-quarters (Clegg, 1976; Goetschy, 1998; Goetschy and
Rozenblatt, 1992). There is little doubt that the minima specified in
industrial agreements follow, sometimes falteringly, the statutory
minimum, rather than the converse. The stipulations of French sectoral
agreements are thus often so loose as to be without practical meaning.
Does this suggest that more generally, multi-employer agreements may
lack substance?
Sweden, the polar opposite to France with regard to density, is conven-
tionally seen as a signal recent case of regime change in collective bargain-
ing, with the prevalent peak-level agreements coming under strain in the
1980s and being abandoned by the employers in 1990 (Kjellberg, 1998)
— though decentralization was mitigated by the development of
procedural framework agreements in the 1990s (Elvander, 2002). How
though have these changes affected the extent to which company and
workplace bargaining is constrained from above?
Between 1956 and 1982 the minimum wage rates specified in the peak
agreements were well below those prevailing in each industry. In
addition, these agreements also assigned each industry a margin for
general wage increases, resulting in sectoral agreements which specified
both minimum wage levels and percentage increases. It should be stressed
that these industrial agreements, in contrast to those in Germany for
example, prescribed minimum percentage increases not in contractual
pay but in effective or actual pay, in which wage drift was consolidated
(Thelen, 1993). In the terms of Sisson (1987), Swedish agreements very
clearly featured not only safety net minima but wage floors. The peak
agreements of these years displayed solidaristic intentions, and indeed
compressed inter-industry differentials. Yet sectoral negotiators retained
autonomy in deploying the margins permitted by the peak agreement,
though in practice the increases specified for different groups typically
varied in an egalitarian manner (Robinson, 1974). Thus, not only did they
involve wage floors but floors which favoured the lower paid.
What of the late 1980s and in particular the 1990s, as peak negotiation
collapsed? Sectoral agreements continued to provide wage floors, and pay
increases were on average still higher in lower-paying industries and,
often through the use of flat-rate increases, for the worst paid within
particular industries (EIRO, 1998, 2001; IDS, 1997). Strikingly, these
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solidaristic elements are of the same form as those in the years of peak
agreements. In another sense too the break from the past has been limited.
From the early 1960s, sectoral agreements compensated employees retro-
spectively for establishment-level wage drift elsewhere (Fulcher, 1991;
Robinson, 1974). This ceased in the three bargaining rounds from 1991,
but those of 1998 and 2001 sought to restrain wage drift by making some
explicit allowance for it (EIRO, 1998, 2001). The new approach to drift
has apparently been successful. The restrictions imposed on local pay
bargaining by higher-level agreements remain an important feature of
Swedish collective bargaining.
The evidence thus suggests that higher-level bargaining in low-density
France has been of much less regulatory effect than that in high-density
Sweden. What of other nations with very high density? Whilst Lilja
(1998) implies a recent hollowing of the architecture of Finnish confed-
eral and industrial bargaining, detailed consideration suggests that it
remains of substantial regulatory effect. Even the (pattern bargained)
industrial agreements struck in the wake of the failure of peak negotia-
tions in 2000 involved not only substantial general pay increases, but
additional increases for the lowest paid (SAK, 2000a). The incomes policy
agreement concluded for 2001 and 2002 then saw a general increase in
cash terms, significantly favouring the lower paid, allied to an additional
‘equality allowance’ further increasing the pay of those at the very
bottom (SAK, 2000b). In the Finnish case then the substance of multi-
employer agreements seems similar to that in Sweden.
In Denmark, coordinated industrial bargaining is now, at least for the
bulk of employees covered, solely over minimum wage levels. Scheuer
(1998) notes that in September 1997 the lowest hourly minimum wage
featuring in any multi-employer agreement was Dkr 74.80 (approxi-
mately equivalent at the time to €10.00). This contrasts with the 1997
French SMIC of FF39.43 (€6.00), which few of France’s sectoral minima
exceeded. The difference between the lowest of Denmark’s sectoral
minima and the general level in France is only partly explained by the
roughly 25 percent higher Danish cost of living.
Another enlightening comparison can be made with Belgium, with
average earnings and cost of living in 1997 similar to the French. In the
absence of a statutory wage minimum, multi-employer agreements,
which Traxler et al. (2001) confirm are of universal coverage, have long
secured de facto wage minima. The OECD (1998) shows that in 1997 this
yielded a national minimum very similar to that of the SMIC trailed by
French industrial agreements. Multi-employer bargaining in moderate-
high union density Belgium thus seems of comparatively substantive
effect.
Another interesting comparison is with Austria, where density is now
moderate. Pontusson (2000) notes that Sweden’s confederal agreements
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had no parallel in often supposedly centralized Austria, but more impor-
tantly claims that throughout the post-war period Sweden’s enduring
sectoral agreements were of more substance. Indeed, Walterskirchen’s
study (1991) shows that sectoral agreements in Austria have been of quite
limited regulatory significance, with deliberate efforts made to accommo-
date the wages in poorly paying firms. Moreover, as he shows, Austrian
unions and their confederation, the ÖGB, have made very clear that they
consider the shaping of wage differentials quite beyond their remit.
Some organized capitalisms of relatively low density are widely
assumed to feature sectoral agreements of important regulatory effect.
Germany is an emblematic case, with developments in the 1990s widely
analysed as the erosion of a formerly robust system (Ferner and Hyman,
1998a; Streeck, 1997). With German density only ever moderate at best,
this seems quite at odds with the notion that density correlates with the
content of multi-employer agreements. Yet as already noted, German
sectoral agreements relate only to contractual pay, constituting safety-net
minima. Moreover, these minima have generally been far below typical
rates, with some firms paying 40 percent more (Marsden, 1995). In
contrast to Sweden, compensation for wage drift has not featured, and
there has been very much less emphasis on egalitarianism in German than
in Swedish unionism (Thelen, 1993). Whilst the details of the famously
thick German sectoral agreements may have served to reshape the
earnings structure more than has sectoral bargaining in France, they may
also have entrenched workforce stratification by qualification, gender
and age.
In the Netherlands, sectoral agreements secure high coverage, and
Traxler et al. (2001) stress the importance of the wage indexation they
establish. By the mid-1990s, though, with density falling from moderate
to low levels, these agreements often featured minimum contractual
wages which were no higher than the prevailing statutory minimum wage
(Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). The Dutch situation thus appears increas-
ingly similar to that of France. Unsurprisingly in this context, low-
density Switzerland features sectoral agreements covering almost half of
all employees, but those accounting for a third of this coverage do not
stipulate pay levels or increases of any sort (Fluder and Hotz-Hart, 1998).
How do developments in the UK fit with the argument? There is no
dispute that the 1980s and 1990s saw an erosion of multi-employer
bargaining, or that by the turn of the millennium single-employer
bargaining predominated. The same period saw a marked decline in
density, not only in absolute terms but also relative to the (mean) average
density of the countries considered here; UK density fell below this
average in 1985 and was almost 10 percentage points below it by the end
of the century. The UK rate had been close to the average throughout the
1960s and from 1970 to 1985 was consistently above it, with a maximum
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difference of 4.5 percentage points in 1979. Could this reflect compara-
tively significant multi-employer agreements in this earlier period?
Overviews of the UK, such as Edwards et al. (1992), claim that joint
regulation in the 1970s was decentralized. Though also thinly justified, the
judgements of the comparative literature have generally been rather differ-
ent. Clegg (1976: 17) terms the UK of the mid-1970s a nation of ‘two-level
bargaining’, stressing the role of sectoral agreements in not only the public
but also the private sector, and locating shop steward organization in this
context. Traxler et al. (2001) portray the UK in the late 1970s in terms not
only of burgeoning local union organization, but also of continuing
sectoral bargaining, and indeed some coordination of such settlements
under the ‘Social Contract’. This analysis is underscored by survey
evidence of the time. Brown (1981: Tables 2.1 and 2.2) shows that whilst
by 1977/8 sectoral agreements were almost an irrelevance to pay determi-
nation in engineering and in the very largest plants elsewhere in manufac-
turing, in manufacturing as a whole such agreements remained significant:
single-employer bargaining was most important for the pay of 68 percent
of manual employees, but sectoral agreements the most important for 27
percent. Sisson and Brown (1983: Table 6.1), drawing on the first Work-
place Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) of 1980, report that across the
private sector generally, the sector was the most important level of pay
bargaining for more than a third of all employees. They also suggest (1983:
145) that these figures may understate the importance of sectoral bargain-
ing, as the local management respondents may often have been unaware
that pay was determined by such agreements.
Traxler et al. (2001: 117) note that ‘it is wrong to understand changes
in the importance of bargaining levels as a mere zero-sum game, in the
sense that the rise of one level inevitably goes hand in hand with the
decline in the other’. Thus the growth of local bargaining in the UK did
not necessarily mean that sectoral bargaining was fading as rapidly; in
comparative terms, sectoral bargaining remained of regulatory signifi-
cance a feature in the UK at the time of peak density. Density trends in
the UK in the 1970s track a shift from a situation in which sectoral
bargaining was of significance to one in which single-employer bargain-
ing overwhelmed it.
For most nations of the advanced industrialized world, the bulk of
employment relationships remain covered by, and in this sense organized
by, collective bargaining. Yet the regulatory effect on pay of the multi-
employer agreements which secure the highest coverage varies dramati-
cally. There seems to be a general tendency for such agreements to be of
more substance the higher is union density. This is of significance in itself,
but also casts a new light on the limits of the cross-national relationship
between coverage and density. Certainly, coverage may be high where
density is low; yet in such cases it seems that the regulatory effect of
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multi-employer agreements is very modest. There are thus strong paral-
lels between such a situation and one in which there is a general absence
of multi-employer bargaining, such that single-employer bargaining (or
none at all) predominates, and coverage is low. In each case, there is little
or no constraint on company or workplace bargaining, or indeed indi-
vidual contracting. Density emerges as an indicator of the meaningful
organization of the employment relationship by multi-employer agree-
ments.
Policy Concertation and Social Rights
It is also useful to consider the relationship between union density and
(neo-)corporatist concertation between union confederations, employ-
ers’ associations and the state. This requires a metric for national levels
of concertation. Compston (1997) scores union participation in economic
policy-making for a number of European nations in the 1970s, 1980s and
early 1990s. He rates at the one extreme the UK together with France,
with limited consultation, and, at the other, Austria, Norway and
Sweden, with broadly based agreement. Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Finland, Denmark and Switzerland lie between these poles,
with broad consultation or narrow agreement. Extending this work
beyond Europe, Kenworthy (2002) argues that Canada, the USA and
indeed Japan, at least in the 1980s, should be grouped with the UK and
France. Comparison of these rankings with those of density shows a
general relationship, although the classification of now moderate-density
Austria is certainly anomalous.
Recent analyses of developments in concertation challenge this
conclusion, however. Several authors suggest that the 1980s saw a waning,
and the 1990s then some revival, of concertation, with this revival often
exhibited in rather unexpected national contexts (Baccaro, 2003; Ferner
and Hyman, 1998a). Such commentaries counterpose the ‘social pacts’ in
moderate-density Italy with the fading of concertation in the formerly
exemplary, and still high-density, Sweden.3 They also stress the social
pacts in low-density Spain and Portugal and moderate to high-density
Ireland, countries beyond the reach of this article. As Baccaro (2003) ulti-
mately concedes, there must be doubt about the essential similarity of
such social pacts to the concertation which has traditionally prevailed in
the Nordic nations. At the minimum, though, such contributions raise
questions about the significance of the relationship between density and
existing indices of concertation.
Can this relationship be clarified by introducing the notion of social
rights? Comparative industrial relations scholars have increasingly
looked outside their traditional terrain to comment on social rights
beyond those involving representative participation. The earlier
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discussion of the regulatory effect of multi-employer agreements
suggested that density does not correlate with at least some of the indi-
vidual social rights of employees. However assessed, the most substan-
tial statutory minimum wages are found in France and the Netherlands
(OECD, 1998), nations with very modest density. High or very high-
density nations do not feature such statutory minima at all. In this
context, a further examination of the relationship between union density
and social rights at work is in order.
Another aspect of social rights in which industrial relations scholars
have shown interest is the statutory regulation of dismissal and redun-
dancy, and of temporary work. This is often referred to as ‘employment
protection legislation’ (EPL). The index cited and employed by Checchi
and Lucifora (2002) has the advantage of being based very specifically on
statutory regulation, but being encompassing in its treatment of this.4
Across the 14 European countries with which they deal, this index, which
distinguishes statutory regulation from joint regulation better than any
other, bears no (bivariate) relation to union density. Nor is any such
relation apparent in a similar study covering 17 industrialized nations,
extending beyond Europe (Boeri, 2002: 402). There is nothing in detailed
studies of national systems to challenge the conclusion that EPL bears no
general relation to density.
The industrial relations community has recently looked beyond its
traditional boundaries to consider the relevance of welfare states to the
nature of the employment relationship (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). Of
course, the complexion of welfare states is not easily summarized in a
manner which can be compared with density. However, union density is
very weakly related to the share of GDP devoted to social welfare expen-
diture; the national ‘welfare effort’ of the political science literature
(Huber et al., 1993). Moreover, the seminal scorings of nations on indi-
vidual entitlements to welfare by Esping-Andersen (1990: Table 2.2)
suggest that density bears little or no general relation to this form of
‘decommodification’. The Nordic nations with their high or very high
density all feature in the top half of the ranking, and the moderate or low-
density Anglo-Saxon nations all fall in the bottom half; but low-density
Japan and very low-density France are only just outside the top half, and
low-density Netherlands is placed fourth overall. There is thus no general
link between density and statutory social rights.
Conclusion
Whilst much has been written about aggregate union density, there
has been no systematic attention to its significance as an indicator of
the social regulation of the employment relationship. Even the recent
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statistical and econometric literature on the determinants of density has
offered only brief comments on this matter, and its findings might be
taken to demonstrate that density is a mere artefact thrown up by the
organization of the welfare state. The present article has sought to assess
systematically the meaning of density as an indicator, by drawing on
existing literature to explore its predominant associations.
The concomitants of density which emerge are striking. It is related to
scorings of policy concertation and also, though increasingly weakly, to
assessments of the centralization of bargaining. Crucially, review of the
secondary evidence shows that density is strongly related to the regu-
latory effects on pay of multi-employer agreements where they predom-
inate. Where they do not, density reflects the limits of collective
bargaining coverage itself. Moreover, density bears a close relationship to
the extent of meaningful local union organization.
However, density has no relation to other aspects of the political
economy to which industrial relations scholars have given attention.
Density is not related to strike activity, or to the existence or substance
of statutory wage minima, of EPL or indeed of individual social rights to
welfare. Indeed, although this is not the subject of consideration here, a
cursory glance at the broader literature on ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Hall
and Soskice, 2001) suggests that density does not relate to the incidence
of vocational education and training or to the role of insiders in corpor-
ate governance.
Union density thus specifically expresses the significance of unions and
employers’ associations at multiple levels, and specifically in terms of the
weight of routinized joint regulation. Of course, density cannot capture
each of the aspects of joint regulation considered here specifically and
singly. It is a univariate indicator, and whilst it is related to each aspect,
and they themselves tend generally to be interrelated, these various
aspects are not empirically coterminous. Density weighs the totality of
constraints imposed by joint regulation on managerial prerogative.
This is not though to say that density captures ‘labour’s power
resources’, as Korpi (1983) asserts. As we have seen, density does not
generally relate to social rights. Nor is it to say that density indicates
‘union strength’, as Traxler et al. (2001) for example hold. Multi-level
joint regulation does not involve unions alone. Moreover, unions may
have strength outside the arena of routinized industrial relations to which
density relates. French unions, despite their weakness in membership and
joint regulation, do indeed have a political role, though not in routinized
concertation. Sporadically, often at arms length, with all the imprecision
implied, French unions buffet the state (Goetschy, 1998). The French
case, often seen as demonstrative of the very variability of the meaning
of density, clarifies its general meaning.
British experience might seem contrary to the notion that density
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weighs routinized joint regulation. At the turn of the millennium, a
ranking on density places the UK just ahead of Germany, which
undoubtedly features more significant joint regulation, despite the limits
of the oft-stressed sectoral agreements. Moreover, UK density at its peak
was similar to that in Belgium and Norway; but it is doubtful that joint
regulation in the UK ever achieved the weight it has had in these other
nations. It seems that the containment of UK density in the 30–50 percent
range rather exaggerates the significance of organized industrial relations
throughout. The peculiar extent to which UK industrial relations bear the
imprint of their origins is widely recognized, with the enduring influence
of entrepreneurial ideology on British employers, and the craft legacy on
British unions, often stressed (Fulcher, 1991). These unique features may
have tilted the more typical balance between the industrial relations infra-
structure and union density, rendering multi-level joint regulation (and
concertation) peculiarly problematic whilst providing a sound basis for
moderate union density. The UK shows very clearly that density does not
weigh the industrial relations infrastructure perfectly; but even so the UK
is only a partial exception.
Whilst density is thus a general indicator of the weight of routinized
joint regulation, it cannot capture its character or anatomy. Certainly,
density is not necessarily concomitant with articulation, and thus with the
‘organization’ of any decentralization in this specific sense. Yet the
centrality of the concern with ‘organized’ versus ‘disorganized’ decentral-
ization (Traxler, 1995) is questionable. As Crouch (1993: 289) stresses,
industrial relations systems may be articulated but employers’ associations
and, in particular, unions and their confederations weak. Relatedly, organ-
ized decentralization may reflect not so much the strategic derogation of
higher-level bargainers to lower, but rather a tactical accommodation by
higher-level bargainers to a reality already prevailing on the ground
(Marginson et al., 2003). Articulation may be central to the coherence,
perhaps stability, of a national system, but to the extent that the issue is
the very relevance of routinized joint regulation, sheer weight is vital.
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NOTES
1 In the cases of some nations it has not been possible to derive data beyond
1995 or 1997. Data for Germany relate to West Germany only. Comparable
estimates of employed density for nations beyond these 15 are not available
for this period. The database of Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) is far from
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exhaustive in its treatment of some European nations and does not extend
beyond Europe; the series presented here therefore also draws on Price
(1989), Visser (1989, 1991, 1992) and a dozen other, mainly national, sources.
The priority of excluding unemployed and retired membership was
paramount, and some nations were excluded as the necessary data were not
available. Except where there are obvious omissions in the provision of
consistent data by Ebbinghaus and Visser, as in the cases of Italy and the
UK, the estimates of employed density for the European nations covered
here typically fall within 1 percentage point of theirs. In the cases of Austria
and Norway the differences are a little greater for years at the beginning and
close of the period under consideration, reflecting different assumptions
about the growth in retired membership on the basis of the available data.
Beyond Europe, the series generally correspond within 1 percentage point
to the benchmarks offered by Visser (1992). There is, however, a marked
discrepancy in the case of Canada around 1970, for which Visser’s
benchmark is substantially lower than the rate estimated here. Full details
are available from the author on request.
2 Excluding Italy, for which Traxler et al. (2001) do not provide coverage rates.
The correlation with density for the other 14 nations is 0.44 for overall
coverage and 0.38 for the ‘adjusted’ coverage measure (based on the
workforce legally entitled to bargain collectively), touching at best statistical
significance at the 10 percent level (2-tailed test). The correlation with
‘adjusted’ coverage reported in Traxler et al. (2001: Table III.17), based on
different density data, and including Australia, New Zealand, Spain and
Portugal, is a little lower.
3 Various indices of EPL are available but, strikingly, even those of the OECD
(for example 2000), which has directed much effort to this area, are not only
erected on foundations ultimately rather obscure, but also suffer from the
inclusion of some joint as opposed to statutory regulation and more
generally from the apparently arbitrary range of considerations ostensibly
covered for each nation.
4 Collective bargaining coverage, and periodic bouts of strike activity, to
which density bears no general relation, may be central to the legitimacy of
French unions and thus to this role.
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